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Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Markets and Acquirers’ Value Gains 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of 306 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
announcements by UK firms in seventy five emerging markets (EM). Our results show that 
acquirers enjoy highly significant gains during the announcement period of FDI. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the highest gains are accrued to acquirers investing in countries with high 
political risk and high corruption ratings. The type of asset acquired has also a significant 
effect on the gains of acquirers’ shareholders, with the highest gains accrued to acquirers of 
physical assets. Also, investments in physical assets in EM with a high corruption rating elicit 
the highest gains. We contend that UK firms following resource-seeking strategies in EM 
with a high corruption rating are facilitated access to resources on favorable terms and this is 
viewed positively by the market participants. Our results are robust to alternative model 
specifications and the endogenous choice to expand internationally. 
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1. Introduction 
Reflecting the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in shaping the modern 
corporation, a voluminous literature has emerged investigating whether FDI undertakings 
create or destroy value for the shareholders of participating firms (Bruner, 2004; Sudarsanam, 
2010).1 The majority of earlier studies document mixed evidence related to the impact of FDI 
undertakings on acquirers’ returns, which primarily reflect information about the quality of 
FDI, numerous costs and benefits associated with individual transactions, and several other 
important elements (i.e., country risks, mode of entry) that affect the likelihood of future 
success of the FDI.2 Numerous studies also attempt to further explore the major determinants 
of such variation on the distribution of acquirers’ returns and have revealed the significant 
impact of several transaction-, country-, and firm-specific factors.3 Despite such findings, a 
new and important aspect to outward investment is the substantial increase of FDI flows into 
emerging markets (EM), which adds significantly to the level of complexity of FDI success 
in generating future cash flows for the firm. Along these lines, academic literature in 
                                                             
1 Firms expand internationally, or engaged into FDI, through the following ways: (a) exporting from to home to 
foreign market, (b) licensing a foreign company to produce the goods and services, (c) greenfield investment in 
production facilities in the foreign market, (d) merger with, or acquisition of, a firm already operating in the 
foreign market, and (e) joint venture or other strategic alliance with a firm operating in the foreign market. The 
last three methods are in general considered as FDI with cross-border acquisitions (CBA) to represent the single 
most important method of FDI participation (UNCTAD, 2006). We follow these definitions in the data 
collection in this paper. 
2 Most of previous research concentrates on the acquiring, or internationally expanding, firm’s announcement 
period returns. Among others, Doukas (1995) and Francis et al. (2008) find positive shareholder wealth gains to 
announcements of CBA while Gande et al. (2009) show that the international diversification benefits are driven 
by both the financial and real dimensions of multinationality. On the contrary, Denis et al. (2002) find that 
international diversification decreases the market value of acquiring firms. Others have discussed the impact of 
various legal system and investor protection regimes worldwide on the gains of US and UK acquirers’ 
shareholders and show that such gains are sensitive to such country-specific and institutional dynamics (see Bris 
and Cabolis, 2008; Barbopoulos et al. 2012, respectively). Scholars have also confirmed the impact of FDI entry 
mode on performance (Brouthers et al. 2003), whereas others have shown that firms systematically choose their 
entry mode when making FDI (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Park, 1993). López-Duarte and García-
Canal (2007) have investigated the announcement period performance of a sample of Spanish firms engaged 
into FDI and show that the FDI entry mode shapes the distribution of acquiring firms’ returns. 
3 For example, Asquith et al. (1983) show that acquirers’ gains are related to the transaction’s relative size 
whereas Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) show that acquirers’ growth opportunities affect their gains; Moeller et 
al. (2004) confirm that the size of the acquirer is an important determinant of acquirers’ gains; other studies 
confirm that the target firm’s status and the method of payment in M&A affect acquirers’ gains (Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006). 
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international business and finance discusses the associated costs and benefits for firms 
undertaking FDI in EM. These can include strategic, behavioral, and economic benefits, 
lower costs, new and rich sources of inputs/resources, and fast growing markets which 
provide enormous market opportunities (Berry, 2006; Barbopoulos et al. 2012; Erel et al. 
2012). To some extent, these benefits are seen by an internationally expanding firm as 
outweighing the institutional hazards (country risk and corruption), political and structural 
uncertainties, impact on firm overall strategy, weak legal institutions and government 
interference of many EM countries (Hoskisson, et al., 2000). As a result, the costs and 
benefits of FDI in EM should be directly reflected in the announcement period returns of the 
acquiring firms. 
Existing literature on the shareholder wealth effects of FDI in EM is limited and 
available evidence on whether shareholders of acquiring firms benefit from the international 
business expansion is mixed. There have only been a few studies focusing on FDI in EM with 
the majority of them concentrating solely on one country, for example China (Gupta, et al., 
1991) or one region, for example Africa (Owhoso, et al., 2002). There have been calls to take 
a broader research agenda encompassing all EM regions to consider inter-regional differences 
on the same basis as studies on developed-market FDI (Hoskisson, et al. 2000). Moreover, as 
yet there have been little attempts to integrate theories from international business literature 
with theories from the finance literature in the specific realm of the market reaction to FDI 
announcements. Our study aims to fill these gaps by examining the short term market 
reaction to FDI in EM to capture shareholders’ perception regarding the future performance 
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of the firm influenced by the FDI announcement. 4  A suitable sample to undertake this 
research is represented by UK firms investing in EM.5 
We extend the existing literature in a number of directions. Firstly, in order to capture a 
wide range of geographical, political and cultural diversity conditions we consider the EM 
regions of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Secondly, we 
combine key international business and variables supported by theories from the finance 
literature; in particular what benefits the firm’s shareholders accrue and what factors are 
relevant in determining the market reaction to these announcements. Since prior research 
suggests that corruption affects FDI flows (Egger and Winner, 2005) and high corruption is 
characteristic of EM (Abed and Gupta, 2002) we incorporate corruption, a time-varying 
variable not previously investigated within the context of wealth effects of FDI.6 In addition 
to corruption, we include a time-varying political risk index. The remaining variables include 
a cultural distance variable, and a variable that captures the type of asset investment in the 
FDI (tangible or intangible). The type of asset invested via FDI could be important in EM 
where there could be higher probability of political extraction than in developed economies. 
Connected to this we include a variable which captures the strategic aim of the firm in the 
FDI, i.e. resource or market seeking (Brouthers, et al., 2008). Resource-seeking FDI involves 
obtaining resources from the host country which are either unavailable in the home country or 
                                                             
4 Emerging markets provide the ideal environment to investigate the interaction between corruption, political 
risk, type of asset acquired, strategic aims, and cultural distance. For instance, Meyer et al. (2009) discuss how 
institutions (rules and legal/regulatory framework) can significantly influence firm strategies such as foreign 
entry methods and this is particularly important for EM ‘where institutional frameworks differ significantly 
from those in developed economies’. 
5 The World Investment Report (2009) (Annex B), for example, shows that in 2007 the total value of global 
CBA deals reached over 1.03 trillion US dollars, which represents a record increase of more than 62% over the 
value of 2006. In the same year, British firms’ net purchases reached 21.5% of the global market. 
6 To the best of our knowledge, the only study to consider this issue is Pantzalis et al. (2008) who focus on the 
link between corruption and the value of international diversification. It is important to note that this paper 
explores the impact of FDI in EM on firm value and not on FDI flows which are derived from balance of 
payments data reflecting external financing of assets. Since EM typically have poor capital markets external 
financing is very prominent and this highly correlates with foreign owned assets. 
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too costly to obtain in order to achieve cost minimization. Market-seeking FDI involves 
investing in a host country in order to directly serve that market with local production and 
distribution. In our research on EM we would argue that this distinction is particularly 
important in understanding the market reaction to FDI as they can, for instance, provide 
access to vital raw materials or large new previously untapped markets. The UK colonial past 
in many EM, particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East and to a lesser extent in Latin 
America, provides also a useful cultural background to study the wealth effects of FDI for 
UK firms. Finally, the mode of entry into the foreign market is an important element that 
enters our empirical analysis, given that different entry modes affect FDI performance 
(López-Duarte and García-Canal, 2007). 
Based on a sample of 306 announcements of FDI by UK firms in seventy-five EM 
countries over the sixteen-year period (from 1993 to 2008) our results show that there are 
benefits to EM international expansion for UK firms as on average they experience a highly 
significant shareholder wealth gain around the announcements of FDI. This indicates a 
positive perception of the FDI on future cash flows of the firm. More specifically, our 
contribution lies in identifying the interaction of the most relevant factors that should be 
considered important when assessing the merits of investing in EM. Our main findings are as 
follows: first, perhaps surprisingly, we find that the announcement period returns to be higher 
for FDI in EM countries with high political risk or high corruption ratings. This finding can 
be more fully understood when we consider the other factors that are significant in explaining 
the market reaction. Second, we show that the type of asset invested in, or acquired, has a 
bearing on the shareholder wealth effect. Investment in, or acquisition of tangible (physical) 
assets leads to significantly higher abnormal returns as opposed to intangible (non-physical) 
assets or agreements, even in EM with a high political risk rating. There is also a significant 
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interaction effect between the type of asset investment and corruption. In fact, investments 
involving the acquisition of physical assets in EM with a high corruption rating elicit the 
highest gains. Our explanation for this result regarding a high level of host country corruption 
takes a strategic focus. Specifically, resource seeking FDI in a host country with high 
corruption rating elicits higher announcement period returns than a market seeking FDI as 
firms are facilitated access to valuable resources at a favorable price and thus FDI can create 
resource allocation efficiencies in EM with underdeveloped economic and legal frameworks. 
We also find evidence suggesting that cultural differences play an important role in the 
market reaction to announcements of FDI in EM. Lastly, our results confirm that the FDI 
mode entry plays an important role in shaping the announcement period returns of acquirers. 
Overall, our findings have practical implications for both managers and shareholders in 
terms of the choice of location and strategy; since EM attract sizeable amounts of FDI and 
investors require an enhanced understanding of factors that have an impact on FDI strategies. 
Our contribution lies in identifying the important role of corruption, political risk, and asset 
investment type and the significance of the type of strategy in consideration of these factors. 
Importantly, the assertion of Hoskisson et al. (2000) that the transition and transformation to 
market economies can be accompanied by political and structural uncertainties, regulatory 
interference and corruption, should not discourage investment in EM since the shareholder 
wealth gain is greater for FDI in countries with a high political risk or corruption rating, 
especially when the FDI is resource-seeking. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a 
theoretical background and the development of our hypotheses. The next section describes 
our sample and outlines the event-study research method we employ in our analysis. This is 
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followed by a presentation of the findings, discussion based on the findings, and a robustness 
section before concluding with a discussion and implications of the results. 
2. Theory and Testable Hypotheses 
2.1 Short term market reaction 
Prior international business and finance research proposes many theories on global 
diversification and international business expansion. Berry (2006), for example, concisely 
summarizes the positive aspects on firm performance as ‘firms have opportunities to gain 
greater returns from their intangible assets and market power, from spreading risk, from 
subsidizing poorly performing operations and from seeking less expensive inputs abroad’ and 
the negative aspects as ‘increased coordination and management costs, increased cultural and 
institutional diversity, and the complexity that results from differing government regulations 
and currency fluctuations create substantial barriers’. The financial dimension of 
multinationality, or the imperfect capital markets theory (Errunza and Senbet, 1984), suggests 
that markets are ‘completed’ by an internationally expanding firm since their shareholders are 
provided with indirect access to countries which would be otherwise more difficult to access 
due to constraints, such as international capital flow constraints, or information asymmetries. 
Thus, this indirect shareholder diversification increases the value of the firm relative to a 
similar but non-internationally diversified firm.7 
In the research area of the real dimension of multinationality, there are two main theories 
which have opposite predictions for firm’s value: the internalization theory and the 
managerial objectives theory. The ownership, location, internalization (OLI) paradigm 
stresses the advantages of FDI (Dunning, 1998). This theory proposes that firms investing 
                                                             
7 Diversification benefits for domestic investors can also be realised through investing in products such as 
country funds. 
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abroad possess competitive advantages such as unique products, superior technology, 
managerial know-how, experienced and skilled human capital or marketing ability. Buckley 
(1988) suggests that ownership-specific advantages of firms could be internalized through 
international expansion. In this framework, when intangible assets, such as technological 
know-how, marketing ability and consumer goodwill are spread over a larger scale, 
transaction costs associated with the coordination of activities across borders can be reduced. 
Another array of studies proposes a resource-based view (Teece, et al., 1997) and 
highlight that firms enter foreign markets as a means of creating value (Kogut and Zander, 
1993). Specifically, expansion into EM opens up many opportunities for domestic firms for a 
number of reasons. First, over four billion potential consumers at the bottom of the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) pyramid present both tremendous opportunities and unique 
challenges (International Finance Corporation, 2007). There is little doubt that these potential 
consumers represent a huge untapped-market opportunity. Second, firms can exploit market 
imperfections through regulatory system and tax arbitrage, internalize markets, increase 
flexibility, avoid trade barriers and obtain natural resources. In EM in particular, direct access 
to low cost labor or raw materials can encourage international expansion. The benefits of 
expanding and managing overseas assets to obtain these low cost inputs must be greater than 
the simply purchasing these inputs without international expansion. However firms also face 
obstacles in expanding into EM, such as cultural barriers, political instability, exchange rate 
fluctuations, poor infrastructure, or lack of local knowledge. Also in an attempt to access the 
different types of consumers in EM, this can require dramatic changes of the current business 
model and/or of the firm's strategy. Therefore intuitively EM FDI can have mixed results on 
shareholders' perception and the subsequent market reaction 
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With regard to the empirical question on whether there are benefits of international 
expansion, a number of studies attempt to analyze both the financial and real dimensions of 
multinationality and presented mixed results.8 Recent studies, which specifically focus on 
returns to acquirers of firms from developed countries into EM, demonstrate the benefits to 
shareholders of investing in EM. Chari et al. (2010) study the shareholder returns to acquirers 
from developed countries of EM firms. They find a significantly positive shareholder wealth 
gain for the acquirers of targets from EM. Francis et al. (2008) also find a positive cross-
border M&A effect for US acquirers from the late 1990s through the early 2000s, especially 
for acquirers of targets from segmented financial markets relative to targets from integrated 
markets. Berry (2006) considers the impact of foreign investments on performance (Tobin’s 
q) and argues that shareholders value location choices (developed and EM) differently 
depending on firms’ prior experience of foreign investments and the knowledge intensity of 
the firm’s industry. She finds that there are benefits to investments in EM but these benefits 
depend on the extent of multinational operations of the firm and the knowledge intensity of 
the industry. Therefore, the decision of UK firms to expand internationally into EM should 
have a positive impact on the synergistic gains of the M&A and thus yield higher returns to 
the acquiring firm’s shareholders. Our first hypothesis (stated in the alternate) is as follows: 
H1: UK firms expanding internationally into EM experience significantly positive 
announcement period returns. 
 
                                                             
8 Using data from the 1970s, the financial dimension is empirically tested by Errunza and Senbet (1984) who 
find evidence of a positive relation between firm value and degree of multinationality. On the contrary, Morck 
and Yeung (1991) find no support for the financial dimension. However they do find strong support for the 
internalization theory since the positive relation between firm value and degree of multinationality is dependent 
on investment in intangibles, namely research and development (R&D) and advertising spending. Gande et al. 
(2009) provide evidence of global diversification benefits driven by both the financial and real dimensions. On 
the other hand, Denis et al. (2002) find that global diversification results in average firm valuation discounts, 
concluding that the costs of global diversification outweigh the benefits. Doukas and Kan (2006) find that FDI 
has a negative impact on shareholder wealth but a positive effect on bondholders’ wealth. 
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2.2 Political Risk 
Political risk has been identified as a factor considered by firms expanding 
internationally (Henisz and Zelner, 2001).9 According to the most recent indices published by 
Political Risk Services Inc., their measure of political risk is particularly high in EM (Click, 
2005). Robock (1971) categorizes political risk into two elements: macro-political risk is the 
country-specific risk affecting all firms within the host country and micro-political risk is 
firm-specific, affecting a single firm or industry sector. Political risk can originate from 
exogenous factors (for example, the collapse of external markets for a country’s key exports) 
or endogenous factors (such as a change in economic policies or ruling political party), or the 
interaction between them. EM governmental choices to exercise their ‘option’ to alter 
policies can have an effect on a firm’s cash flows from its investment. The most dramatic 
form of the exercise of such an option is expropriation but the political risks faced by firms in 
EM are wide-ranging. These could involve exchange controls, confiscation of assets, 
blocking the repatriation of funds or the imposition of wider economic constraints (Shapiro, 
2006). However, it is necessary to distinguish between various types of political and 
governmental instability, and the instability of policies that have a direct impact on 
investments made by firms. Brewer (1983) finds that the various types of governmental 
instability are more strongly correlated with policy instability in developed countries than in 
EM. An important implication of this is that governmental instability in EM does not 
inevitably translate into policy instability which would have a direct effect on a firm’s 
operations. 10  Thus, it is important to highlight that political instability need not to be a 
                                                             
9 There is no general description of ‘political risk’ and some debate on the definition, for instance ‘country risk’ 
and ‘political risk’ are often used interchangeably in academic research. 
10 For example, some capitalistic stances tend towards less restrictive controls on FDI and remittances but 
nationalistic views can create pressures in favour of restrictive controls. In a similar view, if a country 
experiences balance of payments problems and with the balance of power lying with those generally inclined 
towards governmental intervention in the economy, restrictions on international funds transfers could well be 
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detriment for firms looking to invest in an EM with a high political risk rating. Indeed, Butler 
and Joaquin (1998) argue that changes to governmental policies do not necessarily negatively 
affect a firm and can have a positive impact. For instance, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) loans have been used by many countries to help them recover from financial crises, 
which usually require, alongside changes to fiscal policies, economic and financial reforms in 
the form of tariff and subsidy reductions, financial market liberalizations and banking 
reforms. This can result in reduced trade barriers and open up certain industries to global 
competition, which often benefits foreign firms.11 
In terms of our focus on firm value there are a few empirical studies focusing on political 
risk and FDI, ‘Surprisingly, ratings are rarely used to assess the effects of country and 
political risk on corporate performance’ (Click, 2005). López-Duarte and García-Canal 
(2007) find a positive stock market reaction to announcements of FDI in politically stable 
countries but no significant reaction in more unstable countries.12 Accordingly, our second 
hypothesis (stated in the alternate) is as follows: 
H2: Announcement period returns of UK firms expanding internationally into EM are 
positively related to the host country’s political stability. 
2.3 Corruption 
It would be expected that high levels of corruption would be a barrier to FDI, and that 
FDI in countries with high levels of corruption would be viewed skeptically. A number of 
studies have examined the impact of host country corruption on FDI flows and found that 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
imposed. Conversely, if attitudes against governmental intervention prevail, restrictive controls are less likely to 
be imposed. 
11 Agencies such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – a wholly-owned subsidiary of the World 
Bank, whose main objective is to encourage the flow of FDI to EM – and the Ex-Im Bank can offer guarantees 
on foreign investments against political (non-commercial) risks. 
12 However, it is noted that although only focusing on international joint ventures (IJVs) Borde et al. (1998) 
find that the market reacts less favourably when firms establish joint ventures in developing countries with 
relatively low country risk. 
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corruption in the host country is negatively related to FDI flows (e.g., Wei, 2000) as it 
increases costs, acts as an irregular tax, and a distortion on the incentives to invest.13 There is 
a ‘trade-off’ between the positive effect of market attractiveness and the negative influence of 
corruption – the compensatory model (Brouthers, et al., 2008). 
However, there are arguments that corruption can have a positive impact on FDI by 
‘facilitating transactions in countries with excessive regulation’ (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
Also based on prior empirical evidence corruption is not necessarily a negative factor for 
foreign firms in FDI. Egger and Winner (2005) find a clear positive relation between 
corruption and the level of FDI, thus providing evidence of corruption as a stimulus for FDI. 
They suggest that in the presence of regulations and other such controls, corruption can act as 
a so-called ‘helping hand’. Indeed there are some reported examples of firms, at least in part, 
basing the choice of geographic location of their assets and operations on perceived 
differences in the inevitability of paying bribes in certain countries. 
In terms of the impact of corruption and FDI firm value there has been little prior 
evidence, especially on the market reaction. We suggest that the effect of corruption on 
expected business profits is complex and the levels of corruption and different types of 
industries can also be important factors. However, as high levels of corruption can be a drain 
on resources. Accordingly, our third hypothesis (stated in the alternate) is as follows: 
H3: Announcement period abnormal returns of UK firms expanding internationally into EM 
are negatively related to the host country’s level of corruption. 
 
                                                             
13 A country’s level of corruption can be defined and measured in a variety of ways. The World Bank stresses 
the abuse of public power for private gain (Tanzi, 1998). Western governments and international organizations, 
such as the United Nations, equate it with ‘improbity’, a term which incorporates what is not only improper but 
also illegal (Malta Conference, 1994). According to the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency 
International) EM, including the BRIC countries, have higher corruption ratings than developed countries. 
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2.4 Cultural distance 
Cultural distance could have an impact on the market reaction to firms when undertaking 
FDI in EM. Although there is debate on the role of cultural distance on firm’s strategies 
(Tihanyi, et al., 2005) one of the main themes in the concept of cultural distance is on 
performance where it has ‘largely been taken to represent a hindrance to the performance of 
MNC’ (Shenkar, 2001). High cultural distance could increase the cost of entry, lead to intra-
organizational conflicts and poor implementation of organizational actions (Tihanyi, et al., 
2005). As cultural distance increases, the integration of the partner or target’s knowledge, 
staff and resources becomes increasingly challenging. This concept has long been recognized 
as the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). There are various measures and explanations of 
cultural distance. Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (power distance, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism – see later section on definitions of independent 
variables) we find this measure of cultural distance differs significantly across EM. Also, we 
believe that a British presence in a former colony, protectorate or mandate in EM, can be 
used as a measure of cultural distance. In turn, we link this to La Porta et al. (2008) who 
affirm that British common law had spread to former British colonies or countries where the 
UK had a mandate or protectorate. Since it is more likely that EM with a low cultural 
distance from the UK are former colonies or the UK had a mandate or protectorate there, it 
follows that these EM will mostly have laws originating from British common law. 
Although no direct evidence exists for the relation between cultural distance and the 
shareholder wealth effects of FDI in EM, in the context of international diversification and 
performance, Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) find no relation between multinational firm 
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value and the cultural relatedness of countries within the firm’s multinational network.14 The 
authors contend that cultural distance between the parent and foreign locations is more 
relevant to firm value than the distance between various subsidiaries. They interpret their 
findings as suggesting that cultural distance imposes a barrier to the exploitation of 
internalization advantages. We focus on the cultural distance between the parent entity’s 
country and the EM FDI recipient. Accordingly, our fourth hypothesis (stated in the alternate) 
is as follows: 
H4: Announcement period abnormal returns of UK firms expanding into EM are negatively 
related to the home and host countries’ cultural distance. 
2.5 Type of Asset 
It has been proposed that the structure of a firm’s asset holdings in a FDI is important in 
countries where there is a high potential for political extraction. For example, Caprio et al. 
(2010) find that firms respond to higher levels of political corruption by holding lower levels 
of cash and liquid assets, investing more in tangible fixed assets, and paying higher 
dividends. Utilizing assets in such a manner reduces the scope for extracting bribes from the 
owners of such firms. It is also well documented that although many EM have undertaken 
significant strengthening of their intellectual property rights systems, there remains a weak 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in these nations (La Croix and Konan, 2002). It 
has been proposed that ‘The primary impediment [to FDI in EM] appears to be the lack of 
well-defined property rights that convey exclusivity, transferability, and quality of title... As a 
result, institutional capacity building was, and continues to be, key for attracting inward FDI’ 
(Hoskisson, et al., 2000, p.252). 
                                                             
14 In their meta-analysis of prior research Tihanyi, et al. (2005) find that cultural distance may provide 
performance benefits for firms operating in developed countries arguing as firms expand into culturally diverse 
but developed markets new knowledge and resources can improve performance. 
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This distinct lack of intellectual property rights could thus influence an intangible 
investment made by a firm in these countries, such as R&D collaboration. Consistent with 
this view, Pantzalis et al. (2008) find evidence that a lack of property rights protection and 
information asymmetry problems reduce the value of intangible assets for multinational 
corporations operating primarily in politically corrupt countries. Alternatively, if a firm 
invests in tangible assets, or its activities directly involve the acquisition of physical assets 
such as a mining operation, its investment could be in danger of expropriation, or 
nationalization, in highly corrupt EM. Minor (1994) does show that incidences of 
expropriation in EM have been decreasing since 1960. It is also possible that many firms in 
FDI consider their exit strategy if the potential gains are not realised or there are changes in 
political or economic factors and the firm needs to withdraw from the FDI. Clearly firms that 
have low fixed asset investments can withdraw more easily and quickly than those with 
substantial tangible investments. Clearly the type of asset invested in is connected to the 
strategic motive to invest in EM and whether this is resource-seeking or market-seeking. 
Therefore in this paper we interact the asset type with the strategic motive. 
Based on this information we argue that the type of asset invested in can have an impact 
on the wealth effect of acquirers and that its interaction with political risk, corruption, and 
cultural distance, can be associated with the stock price reaction to FDI announcements in 
EM. Accordingly, our fifth and final hypothesis (stated in the alternate) is as follows: 
H5: Announcement period abnormal returns of UK firms expanding into EM are positively 
related to the investment in tangible assets (due to the weak enforcement of property rights in 
the majority of EM). 
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3. Data and Research Methods 
In this section we present and discuss our dataset and the research method employed to test 
our hypotheses. 
3.1 Data 
Our sample consists of 306 announcements of FDI in seventy-five different EM 
countries by 134 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the time period 
from 1993 to 2008. To ensure we have as full information as possible on the FDI we identify 
announcements from newswires and newspaper files from Lexis-Nexis using key search 
words, including acquisitions, takeovers, joint ventures, alliances and agreements rather than 
online databases. As this is hand collected data we ensure that the announcement date of FDIs 
in our sample is the first discussion of any FDI by our sample firm. However, we do 
acknowledge that information could leak out from different sources, particularly in certain 
types of FDI announcements, and this could influence the results on a market reaction study. 
We exclude announcing firms where we identified any news announcements indicating any 
leakage of the FDI and also that have major confounding events, i.e. seasoned equity 
offerings, stock reductions, profit announcements, dividend payments, other acquisitions, 
domestic JVs, agreements or alliances different from the FDI considered, or changes in a key 
executive, within the five days before or after the event day from the sample.15 We obtain 
daily returns on the LSE and accounting data from each firm via Datastream. 
UK firms stand as the major participants in FDI flows in EM. Recently, FDI in EM by 
UK firms has grown in comparison to FDI in developed markets. Figure 1 shows outflows of 
FDI from the UK into EM with a ‘boom’ in outward FDI from 2004 onwards. This FDI 
                                                             
15 We exclude 25 announcements of FDI by UK firms in this procedure. 
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‘boom’ in EM contrasts sharply with overall FDI activity by UK firms, as outflows of UK 
FDI worldwide plummeted after the stock-market crash of 2000 and did not recover until 
2007.16 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In Table 1 we present the composition of our sample according to industry, year, 
geographical region and country. Asia (Middle East) represents the most (least) active FDI 
geographical region for UK firms. There is a diverse range of destinations for UK FDI in our 
sample with China is the most popular destination for UK FDI but only has 16% of the total 
number of FDIs. Table 1 also shows that the FDI activity has increased substantially in more 
recent years, with 2006, 2007 and 2008 possessing the highest FDI activity (consistent with 
the ONS data reported in Figure 1). There is a substantial amount of FDI research on the 
decisions surrounding entry modes (e.g., Mani, et al., 2007) and of particular relevance to this 
study is Meyer et al. (2008) who examined entry strategies in EM. Although not the focus of 
this study we also break down the sample in Table 1 into the following entry modes: 
agreements and alliances, IJVs, partial acquisitions and total acquisitions and then collate into 
groupings of agreements and alliances, acquisitions, and partial ownership (i.e. IJVs and 
partial acquisitions). All of our other tests are based on our full sample of 306 FDI which 
includes all the different types of entry modes. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Announcement Period Returns 
To analyze the short-term stock price reaction to announcements of FDI by UK firms, 
we use a standard event-study method (Brown and Warner, 1985). The research method is 
                                                             
16 Based on data for outward FDI flows taken from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
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described in Appendix 1. In order to add robustness to our results we use a buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) approach in addition to the market model for our event study and 
describe this approach in Appendix 2. 
3.3 Multiple Regression Cross-Section Analysis 
We further examine the impact of FDI announcements on the returns accrued to 
acquirers shareholders based on a multiple regression approach, where the effects of several 
factors shaping the announcement period returns of acquirers are controlled simultaneously. 
The estimable model is: 
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Where: CARi, is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return (hereafter CAR) of 
acquirer i VHH$SSHQGL[DQGµĮ¶PHDVXUHV WKHDQQRXQFHPHQWSHULRGH[FHVVUHWXUQVWR
acquirers’ shareholders after controlling for the effects of all other covariates, denoted ‘X’. 
The remainder of this section provides a rationale for the inclusion of these covariates. 
Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using the index published by The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control of corruption 
captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests. The index of Control of corruption is time varying over our sample 
period and it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents 
higher corruption.   
Political risk (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) is measured using the index 
published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). 
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Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The index of Political Stability is time 
varying over our sample period and it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), 
i.e., low index represents higher political risk.  
Cultural distance refers to the cultural differences, or gap, between two nations across 
Hofstede’s four dimensions. Using Equation (2) proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988) we 
calculate cultural distance as: 
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(2) 
Where: ܫ௜௝ stands for the index for the ܫ th cultural dimension and j th country, ௜ܸ is the 
variance of the index of the ܫ th dimension, u indicates the UK, and ܭ&ܵܫ௝  is the cultural 
distance of the j th country from the UK. A low ܭ&ܵܫ thus means a low cultural distance.  
Physical assets refer to an investment which involves the acquisition of tangible assets.  
Non-physical assets refer to an investment which does not involve the acquisition of 
tangible assets, such as a distribution agreement.  
The Free Cash Flow (FCF) of a firm is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA) less capital expenditures, or net operating cash flow, divided by total 
assets for the year preceding the announcement of FDI. 
Tobin’s q is measured using Equation (3): 
 
  Pr'  MV ef DebtTobin s q
TA
 (3) 
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Where: MV is the market value of the firm's common stock for the year preceding the 
announcement; Pref is the book value of the firm’s preference shares (preferred stock) for the 
year preceding the announcement; Debt is the book value of the firm’s total debt for the year 
preceding the announcement; and TA is the total assets for the year preceding the 
announcement.17  
In each case, we group FDI announcements into high, medium, and low according to the 
values for our key explanatory variables. For example, a FDI in an EM with a control of 
corruption value at the time of the announcement on the lower 33.3% group would be 
classified as a FDI in high corruption country; a FDI in an EM with a control of corruption 
value at the time of the announcement on the higher 33.3% group would be classified as a 
FDI in low corruption country; a FDI in an EM with a control of corruption value at the time 
of the announcement on the medium 33.3% group would be classified as a FDI in medium 
corruption country. The only exception to this is for Tobin’s q. Following convention in the 
literature (e.g. Doukas, 1995) we categorize high Tobin’s q firms as those with q greater than 
1, and low q firms are those with q below 1. 
We also include in Equation 1 several other control variables that are possibly important 
determinants of the distribution of CAR of acquirers involved in FDI. These include the type 
of strategic investment (resource or market seeking 18 as it represents an important variable in 
relation to FDI and corruption (Brouthers, et al., 2008)), the size of acquirer (the logarithm of 
the acquiring firm’s market capitalization four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal 
(Moeller, et al., 2004), industry dummies (based on Datastream industry classifications), 
leverage (the book value of the debt to common equity ratio for the year preceding the 
                                                             
17 This measure is consistent with the modified version of Tobin’s q used by Chung and Pruitt (1994). Here, we 
use book values of preferred stock and total debt) as there is a far more active market for the trading of corporate 
debt in the US compared to the UK which leads to the reliance on book values for these variables in this study. 
18 For our sample we have 149 market seeking FDI, 143 resource seeking FDI and 14 that could be classified as 
both or were undertaken for other unclassified reasons and were excluded from this part of the analysis. 
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announcement), liquidity (the quick ratio for the year preceding the announcement), and the 
FDI entry mode (IJVs, Partial acquisitions, and Total acquisitions). We also include year 
dummies to control for any time variation in our empirical results. Finally in additional tests 
we include four other control variables related to cultural distance between the EM country 
and the UK; colonial relation, physical distance from UK, following UK legal system and a 
current member of the UK commonwealth. 
 We report descriptive statistics for our variables in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Results 
In this section we present and discuss the main findings of our analysis. We begin 
with the discussion of the univariate analysis of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal 
returns. In the following sub-section the discussion concentrates on the findings based on the 
multiple regression analysis of value gains to acquirers where various robustness tests are 
also presented and discussed. 
4.1 The Univariate Analysis of Announcement Period Excess Returns 
Table 3 presents the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the 
entire sample as well as portfolios of FDI announcements formed according to the FDI mode 
of entry and the geographic region of the host country. The average CAR for the entire 
sample is 1.57% and highly statistically significant.19 This finding supports our hypothesis 
                                                             
19 The two-day BHAR is 1.69% (statistically significant at the 1% level) – see robustness section. 
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1and is consistent with prior studies analyzing FDI in EM which show at least short-run 
benefits to shareholders of the internationally expanding corporation.20  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Further analysis concentrates on the investigation of the mode of entry including 
agreements and alliances, IJVs, partial acquisitions, and total acquisitions. Combining 
together the modes of entry in the host country allows us to develop additional portfolios. 
These include: agreements and alliances together with IJVs, partial acquisitions together with 
total acquisitions, and IJVs together with partial acquisitions (partial ownership). 
Announcement period performance across all entry modes is significantly positive with the 
exception of agreements and alliances on their own, but significantly positive when combined 
with IJVs (similar results are obtained based on the 5-day CAR (t-2, t+2)).21 Our analysis 
based on the region of the host country including Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America, shows a significantly positive CAR with the exception of the Middle East region 
which experiences zero announcement period returns.22 The highest average CAR is obtained 
for FDI in Africa, a continent that historically had policies discouraging entry of foreign 
firms, but since the 1990s has seen a change in attitude in many of its countries to FDI. Many 
African countries have begun to recognize the potential benefits of FDI and have altered their 
policies in this regard (Owhoso, et al., 2002). Overall, evidence presented in Table 3 
                                                             
20 See for example, Gupta et al. (1991) for FDI by US firms in China and Owhoso et al. (2002) for US firms 
undertaking FDI in Africa (excluding the negative returns in South Africa). 
21 Results based on the 5-day CAR (t-2, t+2) are not reported to conserve space, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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 We carry out a number of robustness checks for our sample based on various individual country breakdowns. 
Using the largest three countries according to FDI destination (China, India and Brazil) we find that UK FDI in 
China, China and Brazil, China, Brazil and India do not have a positive market reaction for our sample. In fact 
FDI in China on average have significant negative announcement reaction and are therefore FDI in the other EM 
countries are driving our overall positive market reaction. Results are available on request from the authors. 
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confirms that there is a positive shareholder wealth effect on the announcement of FDI in EM 
by UK corporations.23 
4.2 Analysis of Factors Influencing Announcement Period Excess Returns 
Based on the results reported in Table 4 we test our hypotheses investigating the impact 
of political risk, corruption and cultural distance on the shareholder wealth effects of FDI 
undertakings in EM. Initially we find that acquirers of FDI in EM with high political risk 
enjoy a 1.93% higher wealth gain compared to FDI in EM with low political risk (Panel A). 
This is consistent with our Hypothesis 2.24 Possible explanations could be that the benefits of 
economic growth and lower factor costs are greater in EM countries with higher levels of 
political risk. Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Barbopoulos et al. (2012) claim that lower 
competition in the foreign market (EM) entails lower premiums and thus higher gains for the 
acquiring firm.25 
Results reported in Table 4 (Panel B) show that the wealth effects of UK acquirers are 
sensitive to the corruption level of the host country. Specifically, acquirers involved in FDI in 
countries with high corruption level enjoy 1.78% higher gains compared to those acquiring 
assets in low corruption countries. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 3 which predicts a 
positive relation between the acquirers’ CAR and the host country’s corruption level. EM 
with higher corruptions levels are likely to be associated with limited competition and thus 
lower premium linked to the deal, which increases the likelihood of success of the deal and 
                                                             
23
 Table 2 shows the three main destinations for UK FDI in our sample are China, India and Brazil. We 
investigated if the announcement results for these counties were driving the overall positive market reaction.  
However we found that a dummy variable for FDIs in these countries have a significantly negative return, 
especially driven by a significant negative reaction for FDIs in China. These results are available from the 
authors on request. 
24 Results based on the 5-day CAR (t-2, t+2) are not reported to conserve space, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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 Similarly Waheed and Mathur (1995) in their investigation of US banks expansions in EM contend that risky 
EM generally present greater barriers to foreign investments than less risky EM. This restricts competition in 
risky EM and therefore there is the expectation of higher profitability for new entrants in these markets. 
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thus announcement period returns of acquirers. Table 4 reports also results based on the 
analysis of cultural difference between the UK (home market) and the host country. We find 
no evidence supporting our Hypothesis 4. There is the possibility that, in the face of 
globalization, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions measure needs to be updated or needs to be 
reconsidered for EM. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Next our analysis rests on the impact of the interaction of political risk, corruption, and 
cultural distance measures with the type of asset investment, on the announcement period 
returns of acquirers. We find support for our Hypothesis 5 as the type of asset involved in the 
investment influences the announcement period wealth gains of acquirers. Specifically, FDI 
of ‘hard’, or ‘tangible’, assets or activities directly involve the acquisition of physical assets, 
enjoy 1.60% (2.09% in the 5-day CAR (t-2, t+2)) higher wealth gains than investments in 
‘intangible’ assets or agreements. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Results reported in Table 5 highlight the interaction effect between asset type and 
international business factors (political risk, corruption and cultural distance) in further 
shaping the shareholder wealth gains of FDI in EM. The largest gains to FDI announcements 
accrue to acquirers investing in physical assets in EM with high political risk and corruption 
ratings (the analysis of 5-day CAR (t-2, t+2) confirms these findings). This result is 
consistent with the argument of Caprio et al. (2010) that tangible corporate assets are less 
easily extractable by corrupt officials. Also this implies the gains are higher for certain 
industries (manufacturing, oil and gas, etc). It is possible that the industrial policies of EM 
countries are favourable to such industries, for example income tax holidays, less restrictions 
in profit repatriations, rent free (low rent) land and premises etc. are offered to these 
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industries to attract foreign investments. Such favourable treatments are unlikely to be 
available for other industry groupings such as service industries. Our result can also be 
interpreted as complementary to the more general theoretical arguments of Hoskisson et al. 
(2000) and the empirical findings of Pantzalis et al. (2008) regarding the weak enforcement 
of intellectual property rights in EM, which can be exacerbated in host countries suffering 
from higher levels of political corruption. 
4.3 Cross-section Analysis 
In this section we present and discuss the findings from the multiple regression analysis. 
To avoid possible multicollinearity between different sets of covariates, Equation 1 is 
estimated in a nested form with various combinations of covariates.26 Tables 6 to 8 report our 
findings. Initially, we investigate the impact of the host country’s time varying level of 
corruption and political risk, as well as the impact of cultural distance, as continuous 
variables across Models 1 to 3. The impact of FDI in physical assets (=1) relative in non-
physical ones (=0) is also investigated in Model 4. In Model 5 we include a dummy variable 
capturing the impact of a market-seeking strategy (=1) versus (=0) if the strategy is a 
resource-seeking (as in Brouthers et al. 2008). Lastly, in Model 6 we examine the interaction 
effects between the asset type acquired and variables representing resource or market seeking 
FDI. This is to further investigate whether the type of asset acquired interacts with the main 
motive of the FDI in determining acquirers’ returns in the announcement period. Other 
variables used in our multiple regression analysis include the acquiring firm’s FCF, Tobin’s 
q, log of market capitalization, debt-to-equity ratio and three other dummies variables 
capturing the effect of the entry mode in the foreign market. 
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 We have also ensured using the Variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic that possible multicollinearity has 
been avoided. 
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Our multiple regression analysis not only confirm evidence based in our univariate 
analysis but it also corroborates the principal role of levels of corruption, political risk, 
cultural distance, as well as several other variables, in determining acquirers’ returns. Overall, 
the average acquirer enjoys a significantly positive return around the announcement of the 
FDI, as indicated in the positive and statistically significant intercept terms across all 
Models.27 Furthermore, the high ratings for corruption and political risk are associated with 
higher CAR (Models 1 and 2). These findings offer great support to our Hypotheses 1 to 3, 
which foresee positive returns for acquirers engaged in FDI in general, and higher gains to 
FDI in EM with high levels of corruption and political risk specifically. However, consistent 
with our univariate analysis, the cultural distance is not related to the distribution of 
acquirers’ returns (Model 3) even after the effect of several other factors is controlled. We 
further examine the impact of cultural distance on the market reaction by examining four 
additional control variables related to cultural distance, (former colonial relation, physical 
distance from UK, following UK legal system and a current UK commonwealth relation). 
The inclusion of these additional control variables does not change the overall significance of 
our explanatory variables and only one of the four additional control variables is significant. 
We found that if the FDI target country was a former colony protectorate or mandate of the 
UK there was a positive relation to the market reaction. Our analysis further shows higher 
gains to acquirers of physical than non-physical assets and also to FDI following a resource-
seeking strategy rather a market-seeking one (Models 4 and 5). 28  Lastly, the interaction 
effects between the type of strategy and the type of asset acquired are tested in Model 6. We 
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 We control for industry, year effects and liquidity (using reduced samples for the quick ratio as it is not 
available for all firms). For brevity we do not report the results including these controls as they were not 
significant in the regressions and did not impact on the significant relations we observe for our key variables. In 
addition, we check the robustness of these OLS regression results by using weighted least squares (WLS) 
regressions to compensate for the potential violation of the homoscedasticity assumption in OLS regression, 
where weights are based on the inverse of the standard error of the cumulative abnormal return. We find that our 
significant relations are unchanged in the WLS regression and there are no new significant relations. 
28
 The univariate test of the mean difference between the two-day CARs for a resource-seeking versus market-
seeking strategy is 2.37%, significant at the 1% level. 
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show that only the interaction between of resource-seeking strategy and physical-assets 
appears positive and significant, further indicating the impact of the main motive of FDI 
along with the type of asset acquired on the distribution of acquirers’ returns. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 shows that a resource-seeking strategy elicits higher returns to acquirers’ 
shareholders than a market-seeking strategy. In addition, we show that after the inclusion of 
the market-seeking dummy variable across our models, the impact of different levels of 
corruption and political risk, as well as the impact of type of asset acquired, on the 
distribution of acquirers’ returns remains significant (Models 1, 2, 4). Next, we investigate 
the interaction effects between the type of asset acquired and different levels of our main 
international business variables (corruption, political risk, and cultural distance). Our main 
results from this analysis highlight that FDI in highly corrupted EM yields the higher gains 
only when physical assets are acquired (Model 5). We argue that FDI in physical assets is 
preferred in a highly corrupted EM as the assets are less easily extractable by corrupt 
officials. Lastly, our analysis shows that FDI in EM with high cultural distance with the 
source country (UK) yield high gains only when intangible assets are acquired (Model 7). 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 investigates the interaction effects of a resource or market-seeking strategy with 
high/low levels of corruption, political risk and cultural distance. We consistently obtain a 
significantly positive (negative) relationship between the resource (market) seeking strategy 
and high levels of our international business variables (corruption, political risk and cultural 
distance). They explain that cost savings arising from cheaper resources might not offset 
costs of corruption in countries with a high corruption rating as there is a limit to how cheap 
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resources can be, but no limit to the costs of corruption. However, we believe that in our 
firm-level case, our key result acts as an explanation for the positive stock price reaction in 
highly corrupt countries. It is plausible that firms are facilitated access to valuable resources 
at a favorable price from corrupt countries which is viewed positively in the short-term by the 
market. It is also possible that some firms can create resource allocation efficiencies in EM 
with underdeveloped economic and legal frameworks. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Our multiple regression analysis further confirms that smaller acquirers enjoy higher 
announcement period returns (see also Moeller et al., 2008).  
4.4 Summary 
Overall, our findings based on our cross-section analysis confirm evidence from our 
univariate analysis reported in Tables 3 to 5, and they further support our hypotheses 
foreseeing higher acquirers’ returns from FDI in general, and in EM with high levels of 
corruption and political risk specifically. We show that the latter finding is shaped, to a great 
extent, by the type of FDI strategy followed (resource versus market seeking). Lastly, 
following the theoretical arguments of Hoskisson et al. (2000), the distribution of acquirers’ 
returns are higher to FDI of physical versus non-physical assets, where firms are less subject 
to concerns about enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
4.5 Robustness Tests29 
In this section we describe the procedures we carry out to ensure robustness of our main 
findings. 
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 For brevity, we do not report the results of all the testing carried out in this section. Unreported results are 
available on request from the authors. 
29 
 
4.5.1 Event-study Research Method and Event Window 
In addition to the main event window investigated in our analysis (t-1, t=0), we extend 
our analysis over a longer event window to confirm the robustness of our results. We also use 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) method, in addition to the market model, to 
compute the announcement period market reaction for each FDI in our sample. We examine 
average abnormal returns (AAR) over the extended window to identify whether information 
about the announcement of the FDI is known in the market before of the formal 
announcement, or whether the pricing effects of the FDI announcement are adjusted quickly 
in the acquiring firm’s stock price. 
The AAR for the event days in the main window analyzed (t-1 and t=0) are 0.49% and 
1.04% respectively. We find marginal evidence of negative performance in some of the days 
preceding the formal announcement, but the strongest stock market response is observed in 
days (t-1 and t=0). There is no evidence of a delayed response to the announcement given the 
statistically insignificant abnormal returns in the 15 days following the FDI announcement. 
The BHARs are insignificant from events days’ t-15 to t-1 until the compounded BHAR 
of 2.26% on the event day. BHAR remain significant for the remainder of the extended event 
window. Furthermore, the two-day BHAR is 1.69% and very similar to the CAR of 1.57% 
reported in Table 3. We also re-estimate our cross-sectional analysis in Table 6 using BHAR 
over the window (t-1, t=0). Our main conclusions related to the impact of political risk, 
corruption, and FDI investment in physical assets (and also the interaction between the 
international business variables and the type of asset acquired) remain unchanged. 
This robustness test further confirms our main findings on the positive effect of FDI in 
EM on the announcement period performance of acquirers. They also confirm the importance 
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of international business variables (political risk, corruption, and cultural distance) and the 
type of asset acquired, in explaining the distribution of gains accrued to shareholders of 
acquirers engaged in FDI in EM.30 
4.5.2 Self Selection 
The second issue we address under the robustness section is the potential for self 
selection bias in our original empirical results. Specifically, we are concerned that those firms 
choosing to undertake FDI in EM are precisely the firms that should be doing so, leading to a 
spurious positive result in our event study. This problem also has implications for examining 
the extent to which the market could be aware of the FDI before the first formal 
announcement of the decision, which can vary across entry methods and the type of asset 
invested. 
To address this we have considered the firm characteristics that are likely to lead to self-
selection in the FDI arena. Following Gande et al. (2009), in the first stage of this process we 
use a probit model to determine the likelihood of a firm undertaking FDI in EM. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one (=1) for our sample firms, and zero (=0) 
for a matched or control sample firm. Selecting control firms first involves identifying the 
universe of UK public firms that did not undertake FDI within the period 1993 to 2008. We 
then match our sample firms to non-FDI firms based on industry and market value for the 
year preceding the announcement. We hypothesize that the decision of a firm to be engaged 
into FDI is related to its size (measured by the log of market capitalization of acquirer), the 
acquirer’s ratio of liabilities to assets, and the acquirer’s EBIT, capital expenditure and R&D 
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 In addition, our results are robust to the Corrado (1989) and Generalized Sign procedures and we carried out a 
range of parametric and non-parametric diagnostic tests, namely Spearman’s Rank Correlation, Squared Rank, 
Rohrbach and Chandra (1989), Runs (Geary), Durbin-Watson, Ramsey’s RESET and Chow tests. These 
procedures confirm that our model is well-specified. 
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expenditures, all measured as a fraction of total sales.31 We use the selection equation to 
construct the inverse Mills (IML) ratio associated with the selection decision for each sample 
firm, and in the second stage of this analysis, we include this as an additional explanatory 
variable in our cross-section regressions (Tables 6 to 8). In all specifications the IML ratio 
enters insignificantly and our results regarding corruption, political risk, cultural distance, 
asset type, strategy (resource/market seeking) and the interaction between political risk, 
corruption, and asset type in explaining the shareholder wealth effects of FDI in EM remain 
unchanged. The results are qualitatively unchanged to those reported in our main results 
section. As an additional robustness check we also re-estimate the probit regression using 
multiple non-FDI firm benchmark matches for each of our observations in order to construct 
the IML ratio, where we include as control firms all non-FDI firms with market capitalization 
within 80% and 120% of our sample firm. The results remain again qualitatively unchanged. 
4.5.3 Firm Multinationality and Prior Experience 
Berry (2006) considers the location decision of FDI between developed and 
developing markets. Although we only consider EM we use some of the arguments of this 
paper as robustness checks in our EM sample. Berry (2006) argues that as international 
investment in EM is riskier than in developed markets, shareholders may not value the 
investment in an EM until the firm has experience from previous international investments. 
Prior experience (firm’s multinationality) can be measured in a number of ways (see Berry, 
2006). In this test we classified firms as having prior experience if they had prior operational 
experience in the host country (210 (96) UK firms had (no) prior experience in the EM host 
country of their FDI choice). We did not find a significant difference in the market reaction 
between the two groups (both groups yield a significant positive market reaction). Therefore, 
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 Unlike Gande et al. (2009) we are unable to include the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales as an 
explanatory variable given a lack of reported data on this variable in Datastream for UK firms. 
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the influence of prior experience is not as important in our EM sample as shareholders value 
the FDI decision whether the firms have prior experience or not. 
 
5. Conclusion - Discussion and Implications, limitations and future research 
5.1 Discussion 
In this paper we integrate theories from the international business and finance to 
investigate the determinants of short term shareholder wealth effects around FDI 
announcements by UK firms in EM.  Our analysis concentrates primarily on the wealth 
effects of time varying political risk and corruption levels of the host country, cultural 
distance between the UK (home market) and the host market, as well as strategic issues (type 
of asset acquired, resource or market seeking strategy, method of entry in the foreign market) 
on the distribution of acquirers’ announcement period returns. 
Our results confirm that UK firms experience a highly significant shareholder wealth 
gain from FDI in EM. We show that our results based on market-model based event study are 
robust to an alternative specification using BHAR and standardization procedures. The 
positive wealth effect is higher for UK firms investing in Africa and is insignificantly 
negative for firms investing in the Middle East (and negative for China). However, our 
contribution to international business and finance literature lies in identifying the interaction 
of the most relevant factors and strategic issues that should be considered important when 
assessing the merits of investing in EM. This has practical implications for both managers 
and shareholders, since EM attract sizeable amounts of FDI from abroad and investors 
require an enhanced understanding of factors that have an impact on the strategies of firms 
investing in EM. 
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Firstly, we find both political risk and corruption need not deter a manager from 
investing in EM. Indeed, we have found short-term abnormal returns to be significantly 
higher when investing in an EM with a high political risk rating or corruption rating. This 
would appear to be in line with the argument that corruption can act as a ‘helping hand’ and 
prior literature showing that a high political risk rating has a non-negative or positive effect 
on shareholder wealth for foreign firms. However this surprising finding is more understood 
when we consider some of the other significant factors in our analysis. We find that when 
firms invest in countries with a high corruption rating using a resource-seeking strategy, they 
enjoy the highest announcement period gains. This evidence could act as an explanation as to 
why this particular grouping display the greatest gains for shareholders, since it is plausible 
that firms are facilitated access to valuable resources at a favorable price from EM countries 
with lower standards/less regulations on corruption which is viewed positively in the short-
term by the market. It is also possible that some firms can create resource allocation 
efficiencies in EM with underdeveloped economic and legal frameworks. This is important to 
managers considering different FDI target destinations, each with varying levels of political 
risk and corruption, and considering what type of strategy they wish to follow. Clearly, the 
message for managers is that location choice and strategy do matter. 
Secondly, we show that the type of asset invested in, or acquired, has a bearing on the 
shareholder wealth effect. Investment in, or acquisition of, ‘hard’ assets leads to significantly 
higher abnormal returns relative to investment in intangible assets or agreements. This is 
more so in EM with a high political risk rating where there is a higher potential for adverse 
governmental actions. There is also a significant interaction effect between the type of asset 
investment and corruption. Investments involving the acquisition of physical assets in EM 
with a high corruption rating elicit the highest gains. Possible reasons for this result can be 
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related to the structure of a firm’s asset holdings; hard, physical assets are not easily 
extractable by corrupt officials, or because physical assets do not suffer to the same extent as 
intangibles with regards to enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
We find no evidence to suggest that cultural differences between the UK (home market) 
and the host country play an important role in determining the distribution of the acquirers’ 
market reaction to announcements of FDI in EM. This also implies that, in the face of 
globalization, or the type of legal system do not play an important role in the wealth effect. 
This transfer of ideas and information on a global scale could lead to a reduction in cultural 
barriers and reduce the importance of traditional beliefs about cultural distance. There is also 
the possibility that, in the face of globalization, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have changed 
over time. However we do find that whether the FID target country was a former UK colony 
had a positive relation with the market reaction. Other important results obtained are the 
mode of entry in the foreign market, as well as the impact of several other firm-specific 
factors such as the size of the acquiring firm. 
We contend that the analysis of the above factors on the distribution of acquirers’ returns 
during the announcement period of FDI adds significantly to the existing literature of 
international business and finance, particularly the importance on the impact of shareholder 
wealth of resource seeking strategies when firms invest in countries with a high corruption 
rating. 
5.2 Implications, limitations and future research 
On the whole, our results help to explain varying wealth impacts on the announcement of 
FDI in EM and make a contribution to prior research by identifying the integration of key 
international business and finance factors impacting on shareholder benefits, including 
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corruption which had not been previously investigated. These results lead to an enhanced 
understanding of the decision of expanding into EM. It is conceivable that managers choose 
to announce FDI based on considerations that are correlated with political risk, corruption, or 
asset type. For example, managers could be reluctant to announce FDI in corrupt countries 
until it is finalized or managers could be cautious and delay announcement about investing in 
tangible assets until they have eliminated the risk of expropriation. Consequently, FDI 
announcements could be a bigger surprise when investing in corrupt countries, or in tangible 
assets. Further research could account for multinational financing strategies of firms 
expanding into highly politically risky countries, which is a crucial consideration for firms. 
For example, a firm can mitigate political risk by raising local debt with the effect of 
reducing the net assets of the subsidiary and thus the likelihood of expropriation. Although 
expropriation has become somewhat a past occurrence, the firm could also use local debt for 
other reasons, such as to reduce the impact of exchange controls. 
A clear limitation in this empirical paper is the use of secondary data and proxies. Our 
surprising findings that the highest abnormal returns are for FDI in EM countries with high 
political risk and corruption rankings (using established proxies) requires further study and 
analysis. For instance the corruption index could be serving as a proxy for other issues, such 
as greater institutional barriers to imports, or greater dependence on foreign suppliers of 
physical capital rather than corrupt behaviour. Also there is a possible time dimension to this 
relation as the political risk and corruption rating refers to a particular point in time but 
returns are determined by the anticipation of future cashflows. There is the possibility that the 
market anticipates political and corruption rankings will improve in the future. 
We would also suggest case studies and interviews as a possible further route to further 
investigate negotiations and the managers’ perspective on how the acquisitions of physical 
assets for resource seeking purposes are determined. Empirically, it would be interesting to 
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test the robustness of our results for more outward FDI countries. For example, we discount 
cultural distance between UK and host country in our results, but cultural distance between 
UK and host country relative to some competitor outward FDI firm in a country with 
differing cultural distance might be a factor. These arguments affect FDI flows but the gains 
at the micro level have not been fully documented. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether the form of financing the FDI has any impact on the wealth effect of the 
announcement. In addition, future research can seek to investigate corporate governance 
issues, which could influence the decision to undertake FDI. Finally this is a short term study 
and shareholders who anticipate future profits could be disappointed. Therefore future 
research should consider a longer term analysis of corporate performance and FDI in EM. 
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Appendix 1 – Research Method – Market Model 
The event-study method allows us to measure the stock price response during both a 31-day 
event window (t-15, t+15) and a two-day event window (t-1, t=0). We report results for the 
two-day event window in the main text of the paper. Results for the longer 31-day event 
window are reported in the robustness section. Day 0 is the date of the FDI announcement, as 
taken from the Lexis-Nexis database. The wealth impact is known as the abnormal return 
(AR) on the stock of company ݅ within the event window and is calculated using the market 
model proposed by Fama et al. (1969): 
  D E  it it i i mtAR R R  (4) 
where: 
itR is the realized return on stock ݅ on day t, mtR is the return on the FTSE All-Share 
index on day t, and ߙ௜ and  are the OLS market model parameter estimates for company ݅ 
during the estimation period preceding the event window (t-150, t-16). There are no multiple 
FDI decisions by a UK firm within this window. We use the coefficients estimated to 
calculate daily abnormal returns (AR) for both the 31-day event window (t-15, t+15) and the 
two-day event window (t-1, t=0). ܣܴ௜௧  is the abnormal return for stock ݅  on day t and is 
defined as the difference between the actual return observed and the predicted, or normal, 
return according to the market model. We measure the average abnormal return (AAR) across 
all securities on day t by: 
 
  ¦ 11 Nt ittAAR ARn  (5) 
where: ܰ is the number of FDI in our sample. Statistical significance of the means and their 
differences are tested using t-test. 
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Appendix 2 – Research Method – Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
To calculate BHAR involves firstly matching each one of our sample FDI firms to a non-
event (benchmark) firm based on both market value (MV) and market-to-book value (MBV) 
for the year preceding the announcement. For each sample firm, we select a matched control 
firm that does not undertake a FDI in the three years before the event firm. We manually 
confirm that control firms have not undertaken a FDI during this time period by a search of 
the firm’s annual reports and a news search in Lexis-Nexis. Drawing from this sample of non-
event firms, we filter those firms with MV between 70% and 130% of the sample firm. From 
this group, we select the matched firm with the MBV closest to that of the sample firm. 
The BHAR on security ݅ over the holding period Ĳ to T (we calculate this over both our 
31-day event window and two-day event window) is the difference between the compounded 
return on sample stock ݅ and the compounded return on a benchmark firm b. 
    W W W      , , 1 1T Ti T it btt tBHAR R R  (6) 
where: ܴ௜௧ is the compounded return on sample stock ݅ and ܴ௕௧ is the compounded return on 
a benchmark firm b. Statistical significance of the means and their differences are tested 
using t-test. 
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Figure 1 – Outward UK FDI in Emerging Markets 
 
  
Source: UK Office for National Statistics 
Note: The figure depicts the FDI flows in terms of millions pounds over time between 1996 
and 2007. 
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Table 1 – Sample Distribution by Industry, Year of Announcement, and Geographic Region/Country of 
the Target 
Industry Frequency Year Frequency Region Frequency Country Frequency 
Aerospace & Defence 7 1993 8 Africa 50 Algeria 1 
Alternative Energy 1 1994 7 Asia 131 Angola 1 
Automobiles & Parts 4 1995 8 Eastern Europe 43 Argentina 7 
Banks 23 1996 10 Latin America 50 Azerbaijan 1 
Beverages 7 1997 10 Middle Eastern 32 Bahrain 1 
Chemicals 3 1998 16 
  
Bangladesh 2 
Construction & Material 2 1999 16 
  
Bolivia 3 
Electronic & Electrical Equip. 4 2000 24 
  
Botswana 4 
Electricity 1 2001 16 
  
Brazil 16 
Financial Services 13 2002 6 
  
Cambodia 1 
Fixed Line Telecom. 5 2003 15 
  
Central African Rep. 2 
Food & Drug Retailers 9 2004 25 
  
Chile 5 
Food Producers 27 2005 19 
  
China 49 
Gas, Water & Multi Utilities 1 2006 49 
  
Colombia 3 
General Industrials 6 2007 46 
  
Cuba 1 
General Retailers 5 2008 31 
  
Czech Republic 2 
Household & Home Contents 1 
    
D.R. Congo 4 
Industrial Engineering 3 
    
Dominican Republic 2 
Industrial Metals & Mining 3 
    
Ecuador 1 
Industrial Transport 3 
    
Egypt 4 
Life Insurance 3 
    
El Salvador 1 
Media 14 
    
Equatorial Guinea 3 
Mining 55 
    
Ghana 1 
Mobile Telecom. 7 
    
Guatemala 1 
Non Life Insurance 2 
    
Hungary 4 
Oil & Gas Producers 55 
    
India 29 
Oil Equipment & Services 5 
    
Indonesia 3 
Personal Goods 3 
    
Iran 1 
Pharmacy & Biotechnology 1 
    
Iraq 2 
Real Estate Invest. & Services 3 
    
Israel 3 
Software & Computer Services 8 
    
Jordan 1 
Support Services 5 
    
Kenya 2 
Tobacco 5 
    
Kuwait 1 
Travel & Leisure 11 
    
Libya 2 
Unclassified 1 
    
Lithuania 1 
  Madagascar 4 
      Malaysia 13 
      Mali 2 
      Mauritania 1 
      Mexico 3 
      Moldova 1 
      Mongolia 1 
      Morocco 1 
      Mozambique 1 
      Nigeria 3 
      Oman 1 
      Pakistan 4 
      Panama 1 
      Peru 5 
      Phillipines 6 
      Poland 4 
      Qatar 2 
      Republic of Korea 9 
      Romania 3 
      Russia 14 
      Saudi Arabia 5 
      Serbia & Montenegro 1 
      Sierra Leone 1 
      Slovakia 1 
      South Africa 12 
      Suriname 1 
      Syria 2 
      Taiwan 1 
      Tajikistan 1 
      Tanzania 2 
      Thailand 8 
      Tunisia 1 
      Turkey 9 
      Turkmenistan  1 
      U.A.E. 6 
      Ukraine 2 
      Vietnam 4 
      Yemen 1 
      Zambia 2 
      Zimbabwe 1 
Total 306 
 
306 
 
306  306 
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Political Stability 75 -0.38 -0.32 0.75 
Corruption 75 -0.27 -0.33 0.71 
K&SI 75 3.13 3.39 1.10 
FCF 304 0.04 0.08 0.21 
Tobin's q 304 2.39 1.19 11.25 
MV (£m) 306 14,026.42 2,254.55 26,618.36 
 
Note: Political Stability (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) is measured using the 
index published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). 
Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The index of Political Stability ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher political 
risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using the index published by The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control of corruption 
captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests. The index of Control of corruption ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. K&SI refers to the 
cultural distance from the UK using the equation proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988). FCF 
is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) less capital 
expenditures, or net operating cash flow, divided by total assets for the year preceding the 
announcement. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of the firm’s securities to its book 
value for the year preceding the announcement. MV is the market capitalization of the firm 
on the event day. N refers to the number of observation in each group. 
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Table 3 - Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers According to the Mode of Entry 
and Geographic Region of Host Country 
 
  CAR t-stat % positive N 
Full sample 1.57a 5.47 64% 306 
By Individual Type of Deal     
Agreements and alliances 0.74c 1.74 56% 45 
IJVs 1.74a 3.94 64% 145 
Partial acquisitions 1.17b 2.00 67% 63 
Total acquisitions 2.30a 2.81 66% 53 
By Groupings of Type of Deal     
Acquisitions 1.69a 3.44 66% 116 
IJVs and agreements and alliances 1.50a 4.24 62% 190 
Partial ownership 1.57a 4.42 65% 208 
By Region     
Africa 2.95a 3.11 60% 50 
Asia 0.79a 2.73 65% 131 
Eastern Europe 2.59a 3.77 72% 43 
Latin America 2.53a 2.84 66% 50 
Middle East -0.22 -0.23 50% 32 
 
Note: Two-day CAR (t-1, t=0) on announcements of FDI for subsamples according to entry 
mode and geographic region of the host country are presented. Partial ownership refers to 
joint ventures and partial acquisitions. c, b, a represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4 - Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers: Univarite Analysis 
 
 All Low Medium High HML t-stat 
Panel A: Political Risk 
mean 1.57a 0.38 2.10a 2.31a 1.93a (2.79) 
t-stat (5.47) (1.10) (4.10) (3.79)   
N 306 109 86 105   
Panel B: Corruption 
mean 1.57a 0.71c 1.52a 2.49a 1.78a (2.60) 
t-stat (5.47) (1.75) (2.96) (4.52)   
N 306 102 103 101   
Panel B: K&SI 
mean 0.96a 1.17a 0.18 1.73a 0.56 (0.81) 
t-stat (3.62) (2.94) (0.46) (3.00)   
N 239 75 92 72   
 
Note: The table presents the univariate mean differences between two-day CAR (t-1, t=0) for 
subsamples of the overall sample. Political Stability (Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence) is measured using the index published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) (The World Bank Group). Political stability and absence of violence measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The 
index of Political Stability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low 
index represents higher political risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using 
the index published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank 
Group). Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. The index of Control of corruption ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. 
K&SI refers to the cultural distance from the UK using the equation proposed by Kogut and 
Singh (1988). c, b, a represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5 - Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers: Univarite Analysis 
 
 Non-Physical 
assets 
Physical 
assets 
Physical vs. 
Non-Physical 
Panel A: All Deals 
All deals 
  
mean 0.66b 2.26a 1.60a 
t-stat (2.01) (5.22) (2.95) 
N 131 175  
Panel B: Political Risk 
Low  
mean 0.05 0.66 0.61 
t-stat (0.09) (1.36) (0.89) 
N 50 59  
Medium 
mean 0.83c 3.02a 2.19b 
t-stat (1.98) (3.74) (2.41) 
N 36 50  
High 
mean 1.24c 3.07a 1.83c 
t-stat (1.71) (3.42) (1.79) 
N 44 61  
HML 
mean 1.19 2.41b  
t-stat (1.40) (2.37)  
Panel C: Corruption 
Low 
mean -0.08 1.45b 1.53c 
t-stat (-0.16) (2.35) (1.91) 
N 49 53  
Medium 
mean 1.26c 1.70b 0.44 
t-stat (1.93) (2.28) (0.45) 
N 42 61  
High 
mean 0.93c 3.52a 2.59a 
t-stat (1.76) (4.28) (2.64) 
N 40 61  
HML 
mean 1.01 2.07b  
t-stat (1.38) (2.02)  
Panel D: Cultural distance 
Low 
mean 0.65b 1.55b 0.90 
t-stat (2.36) (2.36) (1.26) 
N 32 43  
Medium 
mean -0.28 0.61 0.89 
t-stat (-0.50) (1.11) (1.13) 
N 44 48  
High 
mean 1.97b 1.53b -0.44 
t-stat (2.08) (2.15) (-0.38) 
N 32 40  
HML 
mean 1.32 -0.02  
t-stat (1.34) (-0.02)  
 
Note: The table presents the univariate mean differences between two-day CAR (t-1, t=0) for subsamples of the 
overall sample. Political Stability (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) is measured using the index 
published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Political stability and 
absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The 
index of Political Stability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents 
higher political risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using the index published by The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control of corruption captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. The index of Control of corruption 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. K&SI refers 
to the cultural distance from the UK using the equation proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988). Physical Asset 
refers to an investment which involves the acquisition of tangible assets; non-physical asset refers to an 
investment which does not involve the acquisition of tangible assets such as a distribution agreement. c, b, a 
represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6 - Determinants of Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.044
a
 0.085a 0.033b 0.040a 0.049a 0.036a 
(4.22) (3.64) (2.47) (3.68) (4.32) (3.16) 
FCF -0.019
c
 -0.020c -0.016 -0.018 -0.014 -0.006 
(-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.33) (-1.53) (-0.52) (-0.23) 
Tobin's q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 (-1.44) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.40) (-1.33) (-1.34) 
D/E -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
b
 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(-1.03) (-1.27) (-2.07) (-0.01) (0.15) (0.27) 
Log (MV) -0.005
a
 -0.005a -0.003a -0.005a -0.004a -0.005a 
(-4.55) (-4.47) (-3.00) (-4.55) (-3.28) (-3.54) 
IJVs 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 (0.75) (0.87) (0.95) (0.57) (0.70) (0.29) 
Partial acquisitions 0.008 0.009 0.017
b
 0.008 0.007 0.006 
(1.00) (1.12) (2.03) (1.08) (0.90) (0.77) 
Total acquisitions 0.015
c
 0.016c 0.015b 0.013 0.021b 0.019b 
(1.78) (1.88) (2.18) (1.43) (2.18) (2.05) 
Corruption -0.009
b
 
     (-2.26) 
     Political Risk 
 
-0.058c 
    
 
(-1.78) 
    Cultural Distance 
  
-0.002 
   
  
(-1.01) 
   Asset Type Dummy (Tangible Asset) 
   
0.013b 
  
   
(2.43) 
  Market Seeking Dummy  
    
-0.016a 
 
    
(-3.57) 
 Resource × Physical Assets 
     
0.023a 
     
(3.74) 
Resource × Non-physical Assets 0.003 
     (0.27) 
Market × Non-physical Assets      0.002 
     (0.41) 
Adjusted R-Square (in %) 10.17 10.12 5.12 10.11 10.44 11.55 
F Statistic  5.29a 5.18a 2.60a 5.26a 5.21a 4.77a 
N 304 298 238 304 290 290 
Note: OLS regression estimates of the coefficients in cross-sectional regressions which relate to the two-day window (t-1, 
t=0) CAR for UK firms at the announcement of FDI on Free Cash Flow (FCF), Tobin’s q, debt-to-equity (D/E), log of 
market value of the firm (Log (MV)), corruption, political risk (PR), cultural distance (K&SI), asset type, resource/market 
seeking strategy and combinations of resource/market seeking strategy with asset type. FCF is defined as earnings before 
interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) less capital expenditures, or net operating cash flow, divided by total assets for 
the year preceding the announcement. Tobin’s q is a variable for the ratio of the market value of the firm’s securities to its 
replacement cost. D/E is the ratio of debt to common equity for the year preceding the announcement. Log of MV is the log 
of the firm’s market capitalization on the event day. Market seeking dummy is a dummy variable which takes the binary 
code 1 if the investment involves a market strategy and the code 0 if it involves a resource strategy. Political Stability 
(Political Stability and Absence of Violence) is measured using the index published by The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. The index of Political Stability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., 
low index represents higher political risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using the index published by The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ 
of the state by elites and private interests. The index of Control of corruption ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. K&SI refers to the cultural distance from the UK using the equation 
proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988). Asset type is a dummy variable which takes the binary code 0 if the asset investment 
involves intangibles, and 1 if it involves investment in tangible assets. The interaction variables of resource/market strategy 
with asset type are dummy variables which take the value 1 if the situation described in the variable is the case and 0 
otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors method. c, b, a represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7 - Determinants of Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 
Corruption 
Model 6 
Pol. Risk 
Model 7 
K&SI 
Intercept 0.047
a
 0.082a 0.038a 0.045a 0.040a 0.053a 0.029b 
(4.18) (3.39) (2.88) (3.85) (3.38) (4.31) (2.52) 
FCF -0.017 -0.016 0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.009 (-0.61) (-0.60) (0.38) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.57) (0.40) 
Tobin's q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
c
 -0.001 -0.001 
(-1.43) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-1.40) (-1.68) (-1.55) (-1.57) 
D/E 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 (0.16) (0.01) (-0.53) (0.57) (0.09) (-0.13) (-0.77) 
Log (MV) -0.004
a
 -0.004a -0.003a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.003a 
(-3.23) (-3.24) (-2.76) (-3.33) (-3.06) (-3.30) (-2.64) 
IJVs 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 (0.50) (0.49) (0.51) (0.38) (0.59) (0.24) (0.53) 
Partial acquisitions 0.005 0.006 0.015
c
 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.013 
(0.67) (0.75) (1.79) (0.78) (0.93) (0.85) (1.58) 
Total acquisitions 0.018
c
 0.019b 0.016b 0.017c 0.020b 0.017b 0.015b 
(1.87) (2.10) (2.41) (1.83) (2.21) (1.82) (2.11) 
Market Seeking Dummy -0.015
a
 -0.014a -0.012a -0.014a -0.012a -0.012b -0.013a 
(-3.19) (-3.07) (-2.67) (-2.93) (-2.73) (-2.39) (-2.74) 
Corruption -0.007
c
 
      (-1.82) 
      Political Risk 
 
-0.049c 
     
 
(-1.72) 
     Cultural Distance 
  
-0.001 
   
  
(-0.40) 
    Asset Type (Physical Asset) 
   
0.009c 
  
   
(1.72) 
   Physical Assets × High IB 
    
0.025a 0.008 0.008 
    
(3.11) (0.90) (1.02) 
Physical Assets × Low IB 
    
0.002 -0.011 0.013c 
    
(0.23) (-1.58) (1.74) 
Non-physical Assets × High 
IB      
-0.006 -0.004 0.019b 
    
(-0.87) (-0.42) (2.38) 
Non-physical Assets × Low 
IB  
    0.007 -0.011 0.007 
    (0.84) (-1.35) (1.29) 
Adjusted R- Square (in %) 10.95 11.05 6.31 10.74 13.15 11.21 7.92 
F Statistic  4.95a 4.19a 2.69a 4.86a 4.65a 3.98a 2.62a 
N 290 284 227 290 290 284 227 
 
Note: OLS regression estimates of the coefficients in cross-sectional regressions which relate to the two-day window (t-1, 
t=0) CAR for UK firms at the announcement of FDI on Free Cash Flow (FCF), Tobin’s q, debt-to-equity (D/E), log of 
market value of the firm (Log (MV)), resource/market seeking strategy, corruption, political risk (PR), cultural distance 
(K&SI), asset type, and combinations of asset type with our three international business (IB) variables (corruption, PR and 
K&SI). FCF is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) less capital expenditures, or net 
operating cash flow, divided by total assets for the year preceding the announcement. Tobin’s q is a variable for the ratio of 
the market value of the firm’s securities to its replacement cost. D/E is the ratio of debt to common equity for the year 
preceding the announcement. Log of MV is the log of the firm’s market capitalization on the event day. Market seeking 
dummy is a dummy variable which takes the binary code 1 if the investment involves a market strategy and the code 0 if it 
involves a resource strategy. Political Stability (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) is measured using the index 
published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Political stability and absence of 
violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The index of Political Stability ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher political risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) 
is measured using the index published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control 
of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. The index of Control of corruption 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. K&SI refers to the 
cultural distance from the UK using the equation proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988). Asset type is a dummy variable 
which takes the binary code 0 if the asset investment involves intangibles, and 1 if it involves investment in tangible assets. 
The interaction variables of resource/market strategy with asset type are dummy variables which take the value 1 if the 
situation described in the variable is the case and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using 
White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors method. c, b, a represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.
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Table 8 - Determinants of Announcement Period Returns of Acquirers: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
Variable 
Model 1 
Corruption 
Model 2 
Pol. Risk 
Model 3 
K&SI 
Model 4 
Corruption 
Model 5 
Pol. Risk 
Model 6 
K&SI 
Intercept 0.028
b
 0.046a 0.018 0.025b 0.043a 0.018 
(2.51) (3.77) (1.57) (2.25) (3.62) (1.56) 
FCF -0.024 -0.021 0.006 -0.025 -0.023 0.006 (-0.92) (-0.80) (0.26) (-0.92) (-0.84) (0.27) 
Tobin's q -0.001
c
 -0.001c -0.001 -0.001c -0.001c -0.001 
(-1.65) (-1.67) (-1.48) (-1.70) (-1.75) (-1.47) 
D/E -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 (-0.55) (-0.86) (-1.20) (0.04) (-0.30) (-1.15) 
Log (MV) -0.004
a
 -0.004a -0.003b -0.004a -0.004a -0.002b 
(-2.72) (-3.18) (-2.00) (-2.73) (-3.19) (-2.00) 
IJVs 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001 (1.05) (0.64) (0.04) (0.75) (0.24) (0.06) 
Partial acquisitions 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.011 (0.94) (0.86) (1.39) (0.82) (0.66) (1.37) 
Total acquisitions 0.023
b
 0.018b 0.012c 0.020b 0.014 0.012c 
(2.45) (1.99) (1.79) (2.13) (1.58) (1.70) 
Asset Type (Physical Asset) 
   
0.008 0.009c -0.001 
   
(1.58) (1.67) (-0.09) 
Resource × High IB 0.030
a
 0.015c 0.021a 0.028a 0.014 0.029a 
(3.76) (1.72) (2.65) (3.56) (1.58) (3.41) 
Resource × Low IB 0.010 -0.016
c
 0.029a 0.009 -0.017c 0.021a 
(1.07) (-1.68) (3.43) (1.03) (-1.83) (2.59) 
Market × High IB -0.009
c
 -0.012b 0.003 -0.008 -0.011b 0.002 
(-1.67) (-2.28) (0.53) (-1.47) (-2.04) (0.36) 
Market × Low IB 0.002 -0.013
a
 0.002 0.003 -0.012b 0.003 
(0.50) (-2.66) (0.37) (0.69) (-2.49) (0.50) 
Adjusted R- Square (in %) 12.78 12.15 9.92 13.07 12.63 9.50 
F Statistic  4.85a 4.56a 3.26a 4.62a 4.41a 2.98a 
N 290 284 227 290 284 227 
 
Note: OLS regression estimates of the coefficients in cross-sectional regressions which relate to the two-day window (t-1, 
t=0) CAR for UK firms at the announcement of FDI on Free Cash Flow (FCF), Tobin’s q, debt-to-equity (D/E), log of 
market value of the firm (Log (MV)), asset type, and combinations of resource/market seeking strategy with our three 
international business (IB) variables (corruption, PR and K&SI). FCF is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA) less capital expenditures, or net operating cash flow, divided by total assets for the year preceding 
the announcement. Tobin’s q is a variable for the ratio of the market value of the firm’s securities to its replacement cost. 
D/E is the ratio of debt to common equity for the year preceding the announcement. Log of MV is the log of the firm’s 
market capitalization on the event day. Market seeking dummy is a dummy variable which takes the binary code 1 if the 
investment involves a market strategy and the code 0 if it involves a resource strategy. Political Stability (Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence) is measured using the index published by The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The 
World Bank Group). Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and 
terrorism. The index of Political Stability ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), i.e., low index represents 
higher political risk. Corruption (Control of corruption) is measured using the index published by The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) (The World Bank Group). Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private interests. The index of Control of corruption ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong), i.e., low index represents higher corruption. K&SI refers to the cultural distance from the UK using the equation 
proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988). Asset type is a dummy variable which takes the binary code 0 if the asset investment 
involves intangibles, and 1 if it involves investment in tangible assets. The interaction variables of resource/market strategy 
with asset type are dummy variables which take the value 1 if the situation described in the variable is the case and 0 
otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors method. c, b, a represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
